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Abstract
This paper presents an analytical and numerical comparison of the welfare impacts of
alternative instruments for environmental protection in the presence of endogenous
technological innovation.  We analyze emissions taxes and both auctioned and free
(grandfathered) emissions permits.
We find that under different sets of circumstances each of the three policies may
induce a significantly higher welfare gain than the other two policies.  In particular, the
relative ranking of policy instruments can crucially depend on the ability of adopting firms to
imitate the innovation, the costs of innovation, the slope and level of the marginal
environmental benefit function, and the number of firms producing emissions.  Moreover,
although in theory the welfare impacts of policies differ in the presence of innovation,
sometimes these differences are relatively small.  In fact, when firms anticipate that policies
will be adjusted over time in response to innovation, certain policies can become equivalent.
Our analysis is simplified in a number of respects; for example, we assume
homogeneous and competitive firms.  Nonetheless, our preliminary results suggest there is no
clear-cut case for preferring any one policy instrument on the grounds of dynamic efficiency.
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INSTRUMENT CHOICE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
WHEN TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IS ENDOGENOUS
Carolyn Fischer, Ian W. H. Parry, and William A. Pizer*
1.   INTRODUCTION
Policy makers must often choose amongst alternative policy instruments for protecting
the environment.  A key consideration affecting this choice is the impact of different policies
on firm incentives to develop cleaner production technologies.1  Over the long run, the
cumulative effect of technological innovation may greatly ameliorate what in the short run
can appear to be serious conflicts between economic activity and environmental quality
(Jaffee and Stavins, 1995; Kneese and Schultz, 1975).  This effect is especially pertinent in
the context of global climate change, where governments have so far been unwilling to
implement measures to substantially reduce emissions of greenhouse gases due to the
potential economic costs of these measures.
In environmental economics a strand of literature, mainly theoretical, has explored the
effects of environmental policies on technological innovation.2  Several early studies in this
literature showed that emissions taxes and emissions permits generally provide more
incentives for technological innovation than "command and control" policies (such as
performance standards and technology mandates) in a single-firm setting.3  However many
innovations are applicable to more than a single firm.  Indeed at the heart of most R&D
models in the industrial organization literature is the spillover benefits of innovation to other
firms, and the inability of innovators to fully appropriate the rents from innovation.  Thus,
more recent studies in environmental economics have expanded the earlier models to
incorporate the diffusion of new technologies to other firms in the industry.
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1 A number of other factors affect this choice.  For example, the ease of monitoring and enforcement, political
feasibility, and the expected costs of policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty, firm heterogeneity and
pre-existing tax distortions.  For a review of the literature see Cropper and Oates (1992).
2 Innovation incentives are frequently listed as an important consideration in the choice among environmental
policy instruments (see e.g. Stavins, 1998; Bohm and Russell, 1985).  However the amount of analysis of this
issue--particularly empirical analysis--is surprisingly limited.
3 See e.g. Downing and White (1986), Magat (1978) and Zerbe (1970).Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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The most comprehensive study of innovation in a multi-firm setting was Milliman and
Prince (1989) (hereafter MP).4  An important finding in their analysis was that--when policies
are fixed at their "Pigouvian" levels over a period of time--incentives for innovation are
greater under an emissions tax than under free (grandfathered) emissions permits, and higher
still under auctioned emissions permits (see also Jung et al., 1996).  Two effects underlie
these results.
First, the amount of emissions abatement is greater after innovation under the
emissions tax than under emissions permits.  Innovation reduces the (marginal) cost of
emissions abatement, which induces more emissions abatement under a tax, while under
permits the industry-level amount of emissions by definition remains constant.  Since firms
reduce emissions by a larger amount under the tax, they are willing to pay more for
innovations that reduce the costs of abatement.  We refer to the industry-level reduction in
abatement costs brought about by innovation as the abatement cost effect.  Thus the abatement
cost effect is larger under the emissions tax than under emissions permits.
The second effect arises from the impact of innovation on reducing the equilibrium
permit price.  To the extent that firms purchase permits to cover their emissions--as they do
under auctioned permits--they gain from the fall in permit price.  We refer to the reduction in
payments on firm emissions caused by innovation as the emissions payment effect.  This effect
is absent under a fixed emissions tax and (in the aggregate) free permits.  In MP the emissions
payment effect is generally sufficient to raise the overall incentives for innovation under
auctioned permits above those under the emissions tax.
Our paper differs from MP in three main respects.  First, we alter some of the
assumptions regarding the process of adoption and the spillover mechanism.  MP assume that
innovators can appropriate a constant fraction of the private gains to all firms in the industry
from a new technology.  In our analysis, we assume a competitive equilibrium where non-
innovating firms pay a royalty for the new technology.  The royalty level is endogenously
determined by the desire of the innovator to attract payment from the marginal, non-
innovating firm.5  An important consequence of this assumption under a permit system is that
the innovator cannot appropriate any of the emission payment effect accruing to non-
innovators because the marginal firm has no effect on the equilibrium permit price.  As a
result, the extra incentives for innovation from auctioning permits rather than grandfathering
them are typically lower in our analysis than in MP.
                                               
4 Other studies following MP have examined different aspects of the innovation process.  For example Jung et
al. (1996) and Biglaiser and Horrowitz (1995) consider environmental policies in a setting where firms differ in
abatement costs and their willingness to pay for new technologies.  Jaffe and Stavins (1995) find some
econometric evidence for the superiority of market-based environmental policies at promoting innovation over
command and control policies.  For more discussion of the literature see Kemp (1997) and Ulph (1998).
5 Indeed in our analysis the rate of appropriation of the overall industry gains from a new technology--which is
obviously crucial for innovation incentives--is endogenously determined under all policy instruments, rather than
being exogenous as in other studies.Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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Second, we provide a numerical--as well as analytical--comparison of policy
instruments.  Thus, we investigate the types of situations where the gains from using one
instrument over others may be important and when they are not.  Our analysis focuses on
emissions taxes and auctioned and free emissions permits.6  For the most part we assume that
these policies are set at their (ex ante) Pigouvian levels--the standard recommendation from
static analyses.7
Third, previous studies have tended to focus on the impact of policies on the demand
for innovation.  However, from a welfare perspective, more innovation is desirable only if the
benefits outweigh the costs.  Our analysis explicitly models the costs of using environmental
policies to induce innovation; therefore, we are able to examine the overall impacts of policies
on social welfare.
In contrast with some earlier studies our results do not suggest a general preference for
auctioned permits over emissions taxes--and emissions taxes over free permits--either on the
criterion of welfare gains or the induced amount of innovation.  Instead, our tentative
conclusion is that a more pragmatic approach to instrument choice in the presence of induced
innovation may be appropriate.  Under different sets of circumstances, we find that each of the
three policies may generate a substantially higher welfare gain than the other two policies.  In
particular, the relative welfare ranking of policy instruments can crucially depend on four
important factors: the ability of adopting firms to imitate the innovation, the cost of innovation,
the shape of the environmental benefit function, and the number of firms producing emissions.
In certain situations, however, these welfare differences are small enough to be of little practical
relevance for the choice of policy instruments.  Thus, an evaluation of the circumstances
specific to a particular pollutant seems to be required in order to judge whether a case for one
instrument over the other two instruments can be made on dynamic efficiency grounds.8
To give some flavor of our results, we find that when innovators can effectively
appropriate a large fraction of the rents from innovation, an emissions tax may induce a
significantly greater amount of innovation than free and auctioned permits, due in part to the
larger abatement cost effect under the tax.  Assuming marginal environmental benefits are
                                               
6 These policy instruments are generally advocated by economists over command and control policies on the
grounds of their static efficiency properties (see for example Stavins, 1998).  A free tradable emissions program
was implemented in the U.S. in 1990 to reduce sulfur emissions.  All three policy instruments have been
proposed as a means to achieving the limits on carbon emissions agreed at the recent conference in Kyoto.
7 Static models that assume the state of technology is exogenous do not capture the welfare gain from
innovation. In this sense they understate the overall welfare gains from environmental policies.  However, the
optimal level of environmental regulation in the presence of innovation is not necessarily greater than the
Pigouvian amount.  For more discussion of this see Parry (1995).
8 Some of our results complement a recent study by Parry (1998).  He showed that the welfare gain from using
an emissions tax over free emissions permits is only likely to be significant in the case of "major" innovations.
Our analysis generalizes that in Parry (1998) in a number of respects.  We provide a much more comprehensive
comparison of policy instruments.  In addition we broaden the choice of policy instruments to include auctioned
emissions permits, we vary the number of firms producing emissions, and we allow for convex as well as linear
environmental benefits. Our analysis also reconciles the results from earlier studies.Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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relatively flat, this greater amount of innovation is socially desirable and welfare is also
significantly greater under the tax.  However when appropriation is weak (due to the
availability of imitation technologies) the emissions payment effect at the innovating firm
becomes relatively more important, and both the innovation level and welfare gains can be
highest under auctioned permits.  The welfare gain from induced innovation is also more
likely to be greatest under emissions permits when the marginal environmental benefit curve
is steeply sloped relative to the marginal abatement cost curve.  Moreover, we find that the
welfare discrepancies between policies are only significant when the amount of innovation
over the period for which policies are fixed is large enough to reduce abatement costs by a
significant amount (around 10 percent or more).  In this connection, the flexibility of policy
instruments over time is important.  If policies can be adjusted at regular intervals (and firms
anticipate this) the welfare discrepancies between instruments are less important.
A number of important caveats are in order.  For example, we mainly assume
environmental policies are fixed at today's (pre-innovation) Pigouvian levels.  As already
mentioned, innovation incentives can differ when firms anticipate frequent policy adjustments
in response to innovation.  In addition, our assumption of a Nash equilibrium in the market for
new technologies may or may not be more realistic than the constant appropriations rate
approach in MP.  Clearly, joint ventures or some other form of cooperation or bargaining
between innovators and non-innovators are possible.  However, we do believe that our
approach provides an important competitive-equilibrium benchmark that is amenable to future
extensions while also providing policy guidance based on numerical simulations.  The results
can then be used to gauge the quantitative importance of incorporating more complex
features, such as imperfectly competitive behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops an analytical
framework that decomposes the determinants of innovation incentives under alternative
policy instruments.  This framework is used to explain our numerical results, which are
presented in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes and suggests extensions for future research.
2.   THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we first develop the basic model of induced technological change.
Then we compare in general terms the differences between different environmental policies
with respect to their impacts on innovation and on welfare.
A.   The Basic Model
We model a three-stage process of innovation, diffusion and emissions abatement
involving a fixed number of n identical, competitive firms.9  One of these firms is an
                                               
9 The industrial organization literature on innovation has tended to focus on strategic models involving a small
number of firms where monopoly rents, timing and preemption are important (see e.g. the survey in Tirole, 1988).
While appropriate for major R&D industries such as pharmaceuticals, these studies may be less appropriate where
environmental issues are concerned.  Major pollutants like sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates and carbon11
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Figure 2:  Appropriable Gains to Innovation with Auctioned PermitsFischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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Finally, suppose that permits were given out for free.  In this case the incentives for
innovation are less than under auctioned permits since the emissions payment effect at the
innovating firm (rectangle hsri) is absent.  Free permits therefore also induce less innovation
than the emissions tax, since both the abatement cost effect and the royalty received from
non-innovators is smaller.
Table 2 summarizes these results.  Innovation under the emissions tax is less than the
first-best amount (due to the imitation effect), except possibly when marginal environmental
benefits are declining.  Innovation under free permits is always less than under auctioned
permits or the tax.  Under auctioned permits, innovation could be greater or less than under
the tax, depending on the relative strength of the emissions payment effect.



















constant less greater or less less 1.  Ex ante
Pigouvian policies declining greater or less greater or less less
constant less same same 2.  Ex post
Pigouvian policies declining greater or less same less
a Our main focus is on ex ante Pigouvian policies.
(ii)   Welfare Effects
High levels of innovation are not always indicative of welfare maximization.
Innovation is costly and therefore only desirable to the extent that the marginal gains from
innovation exceed the cost.  In particular a social planner will weigh the decrease in
abatement costs, net of any change in the optimal abatement level, against the innovation cost.
While decentralized policies provide similar incentives to innovate, they are potentially
distorted by the imitation, emission payment, and adoption price effects, as well as policy
stickiness.  As a result, the welfare ranking of the different policies is even more ambiguous
than the ranking of innovations incentives, particularly when the slope of marginal benefits is
taken into account.
Suppose first that marginal environmental benefits are constant and equal to t in
Figure 1 (or t(0) in Figure 2).  The total social benefit from innovation (gross of innovation
costs) in the first-best outcome is n times triangle 0hj.  Society gains both from reducing
abatement costs at the ex ante optimal abatement level a
0 and from additional environmental
benefits (net of costs) from increasing abatement to a
1.  These gains exceed the private benefitFischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
15
from innovation under the Pigouvian emissions tax by the amount of the imitation effect
aggregated over the (n-1) firms.  As a result, the induced amount of innovation under the tax
is less than the socially optimal level.  However, given the amount of innovation, emissions
abatement is optimal, since the emissions tax (and hence marginal abatement costs) equals
marginal environmental benefits.
As discussed above, innovation under free permits is less than under the emissions tax
and hence even further below the socially optimal amount.  In addition, the ex post abatement
level is also sub-optimal since abatement does not increase as marginal abatement costs fall.
Therefore, welfare is unambiguously lower than under the emissions tax, when marginal
environmental benefits are constant.
As shown in section 3, welfare is typically lower under auctioned permits than under
the emissions tax with constant marginal environmental benefits.  The exception is the case
when innovation is greater under auctioned permits than under the emissions tax, and the
welfare gain from this extra innovation more than outweighs the welfare loss from sub-
optimal (ex post) abatement levels.
Now suppose marginal environmental benefits decline monotonically, and therefore are
lower at a
1 than a
0 in Figure 1.  Thus, starting with Pigouvian tax t, given any positive amount
of innovation, the emissions abatement under a tax will be socially excessive, because marginal
abatement costs will exceed marginal environmental benefits.  In addition, innovation may
now exceed the first-best amount, if the excessive demand for innovation from the abatement
cost effect more than outweighs the negative influence of the imitation effect.
Under free emissions permits innovation is necessarily below the socially optimal
amount.  This is because emissions abatement is less (not greater) than ex post optimal levels,
and because of the imitation effect.  Insufficient innovation is also likely under auctioned
permits, except possibly when the emissions payment effect is relatively strong.  Overall
welfare may be greater under any of the three policies, depending on which policy induces
abatement and innovations levels that are closer to first-best levels.  As illustrated below, this
crucially depends on the relative slope of the marginal environmental function and the
strength of the imitation effect.
(iii)   Policy Adjustment
Finally, we consider very briefly what happens when policies are perfectly flexible
and are adjusted to the new Pigouvian levels following innovation.26  Suppose the tax, or
quantity of permits, are adjusted such that emissions abatement is optimal given the ex post
state of technology.  When the innovator anticipates this policy adjustment, taxes and
auctioned permits become functionally equivalent policies.  When marginal environmental
benefits are constant, free permits are equivalent as well.  Ex post abatement levels, and hence
                                               
26 We do not consider optimal (second-best) policies because they would be difficult to implement in practice.
To estimate optimal policies would require information on the costs and benefits of both innovation and
pollution abatement.Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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effect is relatively weak, as in the left panel, the emissions tax induces the most innovation.
However, when the marginal environmental benefit curve is steeper than the marginal
abatement cost curve the emissions tax produces the smallest welfare gain.  This result is
reminiscent of Weitzman's (1974) result concerning instrument choice in the presence of
uncertainty: steep marginal benefits favor permits.  The reason is the same: when marginal costs
are shifting after policy has been set--either due to random shocks or to innovation--the policy
that most closely mimics the relative slope of the marginal benefit curve will perform better.
(iii) Alternative Scenarios for Innovation Costs
Figure 5 illustrates how the cost of innovation affects the relative welfare ranking
(returning to our benchmark assumption of flat marginal environmental benefits).  As the
costs of innovation (f) increase both the amount of innovation under each policy and the
downward shift in the marginal abatement cost curve decline.  This reduces the relative
importance of the larger abatement cost effect and willingness to pay for abatement
technologies under the emissions tax.  Consequently, the relative welfare discrepancy between
the tax and permits policies is smaller as firms in the low imitation scenario (the left-hand
panel of Figure 1).  As the amount of induced innovation becomes very small the welfare
impacts of the policies almost converge.38  Conversely, when the potential for innovation is
large there is a much greater welfare discrepancy between the tax and emissions permits.39
In the right-hand panel of Figure 5, the stronger imitation effect reduces the amount
of, and hence the welfare gain from, innovation under all three policies.  The proportionate
reduction in welfare is greater under the emissions tax, because the imitation effect is
relatively more important under this policy due to the higher level of abatement.  Auctioned
permits typically induce the highest welfare gain in this high imitation scenario, since the
emissions payment effect is relatively more important.40
As discussed in Section 2, all the policies would induce the same welfare gain if they
could be instantly adjusted to their ex post level in response to innovation (at least when
                                               
38 Nordhaus (1997) makes the point that the amount of induced innovation is likely to be small if emissions are
tied directly to input usage and if the price change in the polluting input is small.  For example, in the case of
carbon dioxide abatement is directly related to reduced energy use.  Since energy is already priced in the
marketplace, firms already have an incentive to find energy (and carbon) saving innovations.  Government
policies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions simply add to this incentive.  Therefore without substantial increases
in the price of energy, he argues it is unlikely that induced innovation will be large.
39 For example, in our benchmark, f=0.11, optimally inducing a 20 percent reduction in abatement costs.  When
f=0.07, innovation reduces abatement costs by nearly 35 percent under the tax, and the induced welfare gain is
twice as large as under emissions permits.  When f = 1, on the other hand, innovation reduces abatement costs by
less than 3 percent under all policies.
40 Note that the amount of innovation need not be large in order for there to be important welfare discrepancies
among policies.  When f=1 welfare is 20 percent higher under auctioned permits than under the tax and free
permits in the right hand panel of Figure 5.  The discrepancy would be even larger if marginal environmental
benefits were declining.  Thus concern about proper policy choice in the presence of innovation need not focus
on large amounts of innovation.Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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marginal environmental benefits are constant).  In practice, policy instruments can only be
adjusted at discrete points in time rather than on a continuous basis.  "Innovation" in our
analysis effectively represents the cumulative amount of innovation over the period for which
environmental policies are fixed (at their Pigouvian levels).  At least for the emissions tax and
free emissions permits, Figure 5 indicates that the welfare discrepancies between policy
instruments are less significant when there is less innovation.  Thus, in practice the welfare
loss from using free emissions permits over an emissions tax may not be very important if
little innovation is occurring.
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(iv) Number of Firms and Benefit Level
Figure 6 highlights the importance of both market size (left panel) and the level of
environmental benefits/initial abatement (right panel).  Both panels show cases where the
emissions payment effect under auctioned permits becomes large relative to the other
determinants of innovation incentives, leading to dramatically higher levels of innovation and,
in the extreme, too much innovation.  With only a few firms, the emission payment effect
becomes large because the innovator is purchasing a significant fraction of the auctioned
permits.  We also observe that innovation and welfare rise for both taxes and free permits
since the imitation effect is smaller when there are fewer firms to imitate.  The initial level of
abatement/marginal environmental benefits works in a slightly different way.  Rather than
affecting the size of the emissions payment effect, this variation changes the abatement cost
effect: when abatement and benefits are low, the abatement cost effect is necessarily small.
The emissions payment effect then becomes relatively more important and can, in the
extreme, induce too much innovation.  At high initial abatement/environmental benefit levels,Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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we see effects similar to the effect of low innovation costs: considerable innovation and an
increasing preference for taxes under the benchmark assumption of flat marginal benefits.41
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(v) Further Sensitivity Analysis
Varying each parameter individually as we have done above may obscure some important
interactions among parameter combinations.  For the interested reader we provide Table 3 in the
appendix that illustrates the implications of varying all parameters simultaneously.  For each
parameter we consider "high" and "low" values, and for each combination of parameter values
we show both innovation and welfare under each policy relative to the corresponding levels in
the first-best outcome.
There are several points in this table worth noting that have not already been mentioned.
For example, so far we have only seen situations where either taxes or auctioned permits are
preferred.  Consider the case of high imitation, steeply sloped marginal environmental benefits,
low innovation costs, a small number of firms, and high benefits/abatement, as shown in the last
line of Table 3 (case #32).  Free permits outperform both taxes and auctioned permits.  In this
situation, auctioned permits lead to too much innovation while taxes lead to too much abatement.
We can also see those situations where the emissions payment effect generates far too much
innovation, namely when there are a small number of firms and a small level of initial abatement
(cases #3, 7, 11, 15, 19, 23, 27, and 31).  As noted in the last section, each of these situations by
                                               
41 These results are obviously interdependent as discussed below.  At higher initial levels of abatement, a small
number of firms will not necessarily lead to an excessive emissions payment effect.  Similarly, with a large
number of firms, low initial abatement will not as easily diminish the abatement cost effect to the point where it
is dwarfed by emissions payment effect.  In the case of market size, the results may also be sensitive to our
assumption that innovators behave competitively.  This assumption is less plausible when the number of firms
producing emissions is very small.Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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themselves generates a relatively large emissions payment effect.  Together, the consequences
are extremely adverse.  Finally, we can see cases where taxes induce far too much innovation:
when marginal benefits are steep and innovation incentives are large (low innovation costs and
high abatement/benefit levels).  A relatively weak imitation effect induces more than twice the
first-best amount of innovation and leads to large negative welfare consequences (cases #14 and
#16).  If the imitation effect is relatively strong this is not as much of a problem since the
innovation level is already too low.
C. Lessons for Policy
The above discussion illustrates that no unambiguous case can be made for preferring
one environmental policy instrument over other instruments in the presence of endogenous
technological innovation.  Under certain circumstances (i.e. combinations of parameter
values) one policy instrument can perform significantly better than the other instruments,
while under other circumstances that instrument may be significantly worse than the other
instruments.  Nonetheless, we can still draw some rough policy guidelines.
First, in cases where imitation opportunities are low and diffusion is wide, what matters
is inducing the optimal level of emissions abatement over time.  If marginal environmental
benefits are relatively flat an emissions tax is the most efficient instrument for this.  If marginal
environmental benefits are steep relative to the marginal cost of emissions abatement then free
or auctioned permits are the more efficient policies.
Second, when imitation rates are high and gains to adopters are hard to appropriate,
auctioned emissions permits may induce the highest welfare gain.  However, the danger exists
that this policy may induce excessive innovation when the number of polluters or the initial
abatement level is small.
Third, the welfare discrepancies between policies are generally less important when
less innovation is performed during the period for which policy instruments are "sticky".
Conversely, if policy instruments can be adjusted at regular intervals over time in response to
innovation, the choice of specific policy instrument will matter less.  However, while regular
adjustment will ensure greater ex post efficiency, some innovation incentives risk being
compromised when the innovating firm rationally expects the policy adjustments.  Essentially,
endogenous policy adjustments create an adoption price effect which, in aggregate, can
outweigh the emissions price effect to the innovating firm and reduce innovation incentives.
In some cases, the extra innovation incentive of a fixed tax can outweigh the ex post
efficiency loss from over-abatement and provide a higher welfare gain than the adjusted
policy.  However, our initial simulations indicate that this improved performance is slight
compared to the gains from adjusted taxes or auctioned permits when the naive policies are
performing poorly.Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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4. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present an analytical and numerical comparison of the welfare
impacts in the innovation market induced by emissions taxes and both free and auctioned
emissions permits.  Contrary to earlier theoretical work we do not find a general preference
for auctioned permits over emissions taxes, and emissions taxes over free permits, on the
grounds of their incentives for innovation.  Under different circumstances, either auctioned
permits or taxes can induce larger amounts of innovation but, more importantly, any of the
three policies can have significantly greater welfare gains than the other two policies.  In
particular, the relative ranking of policy instruments can crucially depend on a number of key
factors: the scope for imitation, the costs of innovation, the relative level and slope of the
marginal environmental benefit function, and the number of firms producing emissions.
Thus, a more pragmatic approach to instrument choice, one that evaluates the circumstances
specific to a particular pollutant, appears to be more appropriate.
For practical purposes, sometimes the welfare discrepancies between policy instruments
are not very important.  This situation is more likely the smaller the amount of innovation that
occurs during the period for which the level of regulation is fixed.  Thus, the intertemporal
flexibility of policy instruments is important.  The welfare discrepancy between the most and
least efficient policies may be quantitatively unimportant, if policies can be adjusted at regular
intervals in response to innovation.  However, policy adjustments, when expected, may trade off
ex post abatement efficiency against some ex ante innovation incentives.
Our analysis ignores a number of complications that might be worth exploring in future
research.  We abstract from heterogeneity in the willingness of firms to pay for cleaner
technologies and the possibility of strategic behavior.  We also assume the innovation process
is deterministic.  In reality, the fruits of innovation investments can be highly uncertain.42  Our
analysis compares policies on welfare grounds.  Sometimes (particularly when environmental
benefits are highly uncertain) the policy objective may be to minimize the cost of stabilizing
environmental quality at a target level.  This alternative criterion may affect the appropriate
choice of policy instrument.  We also assume that technological innovation results exclusively
from deliberate investments in innovation activity.  More generally, firms may "learn by
doing" and become more efficient at pollution abatement as they gain more experience over
time.43  Finally, if pollution damages depend on the stock of pollution rather than the annual
flow, the relative timing of and policy emphasis on innovation versus abatement activities may
be an important issue.
                                               
42 For a discussion of how uncertainty over the costs and benefits of R&D may affect the relative efficiency of
research (as opposed to environmental) policies see Wright (1983).
43 Goulder and Mathai (1998) model technological innovation arising from both R&D investments and learning
by doing in the context of optimal carbon taxes.  Although there are some subtle differences between these two
formulations, they find that in practice there is little difference between the optimal tax in each case.Fischer, Parry, and Pizer  RFF 99-04
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APPENDIX
Table 3:  Interaction of Alternative Parameter Values
optimal welfare innovation level
shift (relative to 1st best) (relative to 1st best)
case in MC tax auction free tax auction free
1 low low high high low 0.02 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.75 0.87 0.70
2 low low high high high 0.25 0.93 0.57 0.56 0.73 0.43 0.41
3 low low high low low 0.02 0.97 -22.69 0.92 0.83 5.70 0.78
4 low low high low high 0.25 0.97 0.20 0.60 0.82 1.15 0.47
5 low low low high low 0.06 0.94 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.77 0.63
6 low low low high high 0.77 0.99 0.13 0.13 0.95 0.16 0.15
7 low low low low low 0.06 0.97 -14.31 0.85 0.83 4.55 0.71
8 low low low low high 0.77 0.99 0.11 0.14 0.96 0.41 0.18
9 low high high high low 0.02 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.77 0.89 0.72
10 low high high high high 0.19 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.98 0.58 0.55
11 low high high low low 0.02 0.96 -23.25 0.95 0.85 5.85 0.80
12 low high high low high 0.19 0.63 0.26 0.79 1.10 1.55 0.64
13 low high low high low 0.06 0.92 0.93 0.86 0.80 0.82 0.67
14 low high low high high 0.41 -15.90 0.59 0.58 2.62 0.44 0.42
15 low high low low low 0.06 0.93 -15.30 0.91 0.89 4.87 0.76
16 low high low low high 0.41 -15.88 0.48 0.64 2.67 1.15 0.51
17 high low high high low 0.02 0.44 0.65 0.43 0.25 0.42 0.25
18 high low high high high 0.25 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.21 0.20 0.17
19 high low high low low 0.02 0.75 -20.90 0.72 0.50 5.52 0.48
20 high low high low high 0.25 0.69 0.29 0.49 0.44 1.10 0.33
21 high low low high low 0.06 0.43 0.61 0.40 0.25 0.39 0.23
22 high low low high high 0.77 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.08
23 high low low low low 0.06 0.74 -13.63 0.67 0.49 4.47 0.45
24 high low low low high 0.77 0.39 0.11 0.13 0.38 0.41 0.14
25 high high high high low 0.02 0.45 0.67 0.44 0.26 0.43 0.25
26 high high high high high 0.19 0.47 0.46 0.40 0.29 0.27 0.23
27 high high high low low 0.02 0.75 -21.42 0.74 0.51 5.66 0.49
28 high high high low high 0.19 0.74 0.38 0.65 0.59 1.47 0.44
29 high high low high low 0.06 0.46 0.65 0.43 0.27 0.42 0.25
30 high high low high high 0.41 0.51 0.40 0.35 0.39 0.25 0.21
31 high high low low low 0.06 0.75 -14.57 0.72 0.52 4.78 0.48
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